

A Comparative Analysis of Cost Change for Low-Cost, Full-Service, and Other Carriers in the US Airline Industry

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Abstract

This study compares cost and productivity changes of full-service carriers (FSCs), low-cost carriers (LCCs) and 'other' carriers classified as regional or charter firms. Findings show cost reductions of 17 percent for FSCs, 11 percent for LCCs, and 8 percent for others from 1993 to 2010. Nontrivial productivity gains due to increases in load factor and stage length explain the findings for FSCs. Reductions in input prices explain the cost declines for LCCs, while productivity gains due to increases in load factor and stage length and unexplained technical change contribute to cost declines for 'other' carriers. These findings are interpreted as indicating (1) the LCC cost advantage over FSCs has eroded somewhat over this period, and (2) sources of cost reductions over this period differ by air carrier classification.

I. Introduction

A substantial amount of research examines productivity growth following regulatory reform of the U.S. airline industry (See for instance, Oum and Yu, 1995 and Good, Nadiri, Roller and Sickles, 1993). Most of the findings from past research suggest that following regulatory reform airline companies in the U.S. experienced improvements in productivity. A contributing factor toward such growth has been the influence of low cost carriers (LCCs) on industry productivity.

Competitive pressure from LCCs has contributed to increased efficiency and the threat of bankruptcy for full-service (sometimes referred to as legacy) carriers. For instance, in the last 12 years, each of the four largest U.S. carriers has declared bankruptcy. Tsoukalas, Belobaba, and Swelbar (2008) point out that bankruptcy and the threat of bankruptcy has allowed legacy (FSC) carriers to negotiate more favorable labor contracts, resulting in cost reductions. Moreover, they also suggest that increased labor seniority and slower growth have contributed to higher costs for LCCs. In fact, Tsoukalas, Belobaba, and Swelbar (2008) estimate that the average difference in labor cost per available seat mile between legacy carriers and low cost carriers decreased from 1.2 cents in 2000 to 0.3 cents in 2006. Further evidence of cost convergence between LCC and legacy carrier costs is presented by KPMG (2013), who in a global survey of airlines, find that average costs per available seat kilometer were 3.6 cents higher for legacy carriers than LCCs in 2006 and only 2.5 cents higher in 2011.

On the other hand, Borenstein (2011) argues that the cost difference between LCCs and legacy carriers has not converged in recent years, with costs adjusted for average flight distance remaining 40 percent higher for FSCs in comparison to LCCs over the last decade. Given the

recent disagreement as to whether LCC and FSC costs are converging, and a lack of understanding on the reasons for LCC and FSC cost movement in recent years, this study explores recent cost changes for LCC and non-LCC carriers. Cost change is decomposed to identify productivity change from changes in density, firm size, movement characteristics, and technical change, and changes in input prices.

The remainder of this study consists of four additional sections. The next section examines various airline business models, and identifies factors that may contribute to varying productivity trends for LCCs, FSCs, and other carriers. Distinguishing the various airline business models is important, as major differences in business strategies among the various airline types have significant implications for costs and revenues. Section III describes the data construction and the empirical approach used to estimate cost function for LCCs, FSCs, and the group of ‘other’ carriers consisting of regional and charter companies. Section IV presents cost findings for each carrier group, and concluding remarks are provided in section V.

II. Classifying the Airlines

While airlines employ a variety of strategies to control costs and to generate revenues, there are four basic types of carriers today, with carriers in each category employing similarities in the general business model employed (Leick and Wensveen, 2014). These include: (1) Full-Service Carriers (FSCs) – often referred to as network carriers or legacy carriers – providing frequent service using a hub and spoke network; (2) low-cost carriers (LCCs) providing point-to-point service, often using less congested secondary airports; (3) regional carriers (RCs) serving as feeders to the FSCs, and often not ticketing passengers; and (4) charter carriers (CCs) providing unscheduled service for vacation packages (Leick and Wensveen, 2014).

A. *Full-Service Carriers (FSCs)*

Although business models have been changing somewhat, the traditional full-service carrier is one that provides frequent service to a wide-variety of destinations, and provides a number of ancillary services, including complementary beverages, in-flight entertainment, airport lounges, and assigned seating (Huschelrath and Muller, 2012; Gillen, 2006; Leick and Wensveen, 2014). In essence, the FSC aims to be the one-stop air transportation provider to the communities it serves – providing air travel to business and vacation travelers to domestic and international destinations (often through alliances with international airlines).

Generally, travelers have a number of choices for flight times, and can arrive at many destinations without switching airlines. The major innovation that has enabled success of the FSC in providing service to a large number of origin-destination pairs, with frequent service has been the development of the hub-and-spoke system (Gillen, 2006; Bailey, 2002; Borenstein, 1992; Peteraf and Reed, 2008; Pels, 2008).

Gillen (2006) reports that some U.S. airlines had organized into hub-and-spoke networks prior to deregulation in 1978 (e.g. Delta). However, because regulation restricted route entry and exit, most airlines did not develop hub-and-spoke networks until after deregulation (Borenstein, 1992;

Bailey, 2002; Gillen, 2006; Pels, 2008; Peteraf and Reed, 2008; Leick and Wensveen). Under a hub-and-spoke network, the carrier operates flights from smaller markets to a hub airport, timing arrivals close together so that passengers can then connect to flights from the hub to other markets. A major advantage of the hub-and-spoke system for the carrier is that it gives the carrier the ability to generate more traffic over light-density and high-density routes, and therefore to realize economies of density (Caves, Christensen, and Tretheway, 1984 show that airlines are characterized by economies of density). Carriers are able to use larger aircraft, to realize higher load factors (more passengers per available seat), and offer greater service frequency. Passengers benefit from the increased frequency of service and the wider array of destinations accessible without switching airlines.

As Borenstein (1992) points out, the benefits conferred to passengers from increased service frequency and an increase in the number of travel destinations, translate into market power for FSCs. Borenstein (1992) highlights the use of frequent flier programs (FFPs) (first introduced by American Airlines in 1981) to increase market power at hub airports. Since the hub carrier serves more routes from the hub airport than other carriers, it is easier for consumers to accumulate more frequent flier miles with that carrier. Furthermore, the benefit of obtaining frequent flier miles is more valuable on that carrier (as they have access to free trips to more destinations). This induces customer loyalty and results in increased pricing power – particularly for business trips (the highest yielding trips for the carrier). Because of a principal-agent problem, business travelers have an incentive to pursue travel on the carrier that generates the best frequent flier benefits, rather than on the carrier that charges the lowest fare (the company pays the airfare) (Borenstein, 1992).

In addition to being characterized by hub-and-spoke networks, another important characteristic of the FSCs is their use of complex yield management techniques. Yield management is another name for techniques used to maximize revenues. Strategies encompassed in yield management include overbooking, charging higher prices to customers with more inelastic demand (business travelers), and traffic management – or managing traffic to and from hubs to maximize revenues (Voneche, 2005). For the FSC, that offers refundable tickets, serves a large number of airports, and carries passengers together that are traveling to different destinations, this can be extremely complex.

Finally, as mentioned previously, the FSCs are often referred to as legacy carriers, as they were in existence prior to deregulation. While the term “legacy” is not as informative in terms of business strategy, it suggests an important characteristic that distinguishes these carriers from newer carriers – less flexible labor. These carriers existed during the less competitive era of regulation, when carrier resistance to union demands may have been reduced by the lack of competitive pressure (Hirsch and Macpherson, 2000). Although these carriers have been able to renegotiate labor contracts to increase the flexibility of labor, they continue to be plagued by work rules that create less flexible labor (see Bitzan and Peoples, 2014).

In summary, the FSCs can be characterized as offering a full range of services, operating with a hub-and-spoke network, operating a variety of plane sizes to accommodate different markets, and using yield management techniques to increase load factors and revenues. These carriers may also be plagued by less flexible labor and high union wages.

B. Low-Cost Carriers (LCCs)

A recently growing alternative model to the FSC model is the low-cost carrier model that focusses on no-frills, point-to-point service. Prior to deregulation, two U.S. airlines - Western Pacific and Southwest – operated point-to-point services in the deregulated intrastate markets of California and Texas, respectively (Bailey, 2002; Gillen and Gados, 2008). These carriers had fares that were 50 percent lower than those set by the CAB, and they were profitable (Bailey, 2002). Moreover, these served as a justification for deregulating the industry (Gillen and Gados, 2008). In one study, Keeler (1972) estimated an industry cost function, and then adjusted it to reflect the efficiencies of Western Pacific operating in California. He showed that regulated fares were between 20 and 95 percent above predicted unregulated fares in 1968.

Since deregulation, many new entrants have attempted to use a low-cost strategy – some successful and others not (Gillen and Gados, 2008). Like the FSC model, not all LCCs are alike. However, several common cost-reducing strategies have been employed by the most successful LCCs.

A number of authors suggest characteristics that enable LCC carriers to realize lower costs in comparison to the FSCs (Gillen, 2006; Button and Ison, 2008; Gillen and Gados, 2008; Pels, 2008; Pitfield, 2008; Huschelrath and Muller, 2012; Leick and Wensveen, 2014). These include: (1) operating a point-to-point network, allowing the carrier to realize savings in ground crew, maintenance, gates and other airport expenses from not having to accommodate a number of arrivals at approximately the same time to facilitate connections; (2) a uniform airline fleet, allowing the carrier to realize savings in buying parts, in maintenance, and in training costs (employees specialize in one type of aircraft); (3) serving smaller, secondary airports, where airport charges are often lower and where there is less congestion, resulting in faster turnaround of planes; (4) no-frills service or unbundling of services, including unreserved seating, no free food/beverages, no free baggage, no in-flight entertainment; (5) plane configurations that have more seats per plane and non-reclining seats, allowing the carrier to carry more passengers on a given flight; (6) simplified yield management, with fewer classes of passengers, resulting in savings in analytics; (7) using fewer employees per aircraft; and (8) using non-union labor. In addition, these carriers have used innovations to increase revenues. For example, in addition to selling the unbundled services, such as food and beverage, their websites often include options for hotel bookings and automobile rentals (Pitfield, 2008). Moreover, many don't use FFPs, as the advantage in terms of customer loyalty are not as big for these non-hub carriers.

As suggested by some of the strategies used by the LCCs to reduce costs (e.g. no-frills service, and more seats per plane), the LCCs may also be thought of as low-fare carriers. Gillen and Gados (2008) highlight the large number of entrants into the low-frills/low fare sector right after deregulation. However, as the authors state, the reason that many of these carriers were not successful is that they relied solely on a factor price advantage (through non-unionized labor), rather than using a new business strategy. Eventually, successful carriers copied many of the business practices of Southwest, and those carriers expanded the market for air travel (Gillen and Gados, 2008). Gillen and Gados (2008) argue that after originally serving to get customers to travel that otherwise wouldn't, they now compete on many segments with the FSCs.

In summary, the LCCs can be characterized as offering no-frills service, operating with a point-to-point network, serving secondary airports, and employing a variety of techniques to achieve low-cost service (including achieving very high load factors). These carriers tend to charge lower fares, but often enhance those revenues by selling a variety of ancillary services.

C. Regional and Charter Carriers ('other carriers')

Regional carriers serve as feeders to the FSCs, serving small communities and transporting passengers to FSC hub airports. These carriers generally operate very small jets or turbo-prop airplanes, and typically offer one class of service (Leick and Wensveen, 2014). Moreover, they contract their capacity to the FSCs and do not sell their own tickets (ibid).

In many ways, the charter carriers are like the LCCs in that they employ similar strategies to reduce costs. Similar strategies include using few cabin staff, configuring planes to accommodate more seats, focusing on price sensitive customers, and various strategies to achieve a high load factor and high aircraft utilization (Pels, 2008). Unlike, LCCs, however, charter carriers do not provide scheduled service. The number of charter carriers has decreased since deregulation due to increased pricing freedoms given to established carriers (Gillen, 2006). Most charter airlines are involved in all-inclusive vacations now (Leick and Wensveen, 2014).

D. Comparing the Underlying Cost-Influencing Differences Between LCCs, FSCs and other carriers

As mentioned in the previous section, LCCs and FSCs use a variety of strategies to achieve low costs and high revenues. However, the obvious question that might be asked is: how these differences translate into measureable variables?

A variety of factors may contribute to a cost advantage for FSCs. Larger plane sizes, higher load factors, and increased service frequency are all benefits of the hub-and-spoke configuration used by FSCs. Chopra and Lisiak (year) in examining FSCs and LCCs between 1994 and 2004, find that the average load factor is higher for FSCs in every year except 1994. They suggest that this advantage is likely to persist due to the nature of hub-and-spoke operations. The advantages of larger plane sizes and service frequency are likely to show up as higher traffic densities for the FSC carrier. This FSC cost advantage is especially prevalent when comparing operations of this carrier group with the regional companies serving small communities due to the low population densities of these locations. FSCs are likely to also experience a cost advantage over charter carriers, because this group of 'other carriers' are characterized as small companies that do not benefit from the economies of size associated with FSC operations.

Chopra and Lisiak (year) also find that stage length is consistently higher for FSCs in comparison to LCCs throughout the 1994-2004 period. This advantage is largely due to flying internationally (Chopra and Lisiak, year).

LCCs also have a variety of factors contributing to cost advantages. The point-to-point network allows for savings in ground crew, gates, maintenance, and other airport expenses due to flights

being more spread out. Chopra and Lisiak (year) show that LCCs consistently utilized less employees per available seat mile in comparison to FSCs between 1994 and 2004. They also find that the rate of pay per employee is consistently less for LCCs over this period, but suggest that this advantage may not be sustainable. Chopra and Lisiak say this difference is due to differences in pension and insurance benefits – and that these benefits are being renegotiated by FSCs.

Other LCC cost advantages are likely to show up in lower aircraft maintenance and training expenses from using a uniform fleet, lower airport charges and faster turnaround from serving secondary airports, less ancillary costs from no-frills services, more passengers per plane due to tighter seating configuration, and less need to manage complex yield management systems. Chopra and Lisiak show that block hours (hours between aircraft departure and arrival) per plane are consistently higher for LCCs than FSCs between 1994 and 2004, supporting the idea of a faster turnaround due to serving secondary airports. While investigating each of these individual items is beyond the scope of our study, it is important to keep in mind that there are reasons to suspect cost advantages to each type of carrier for different reasons.

E. A Convergence Between LCCs and FSCs?

A number of authors point to increased competition between LCCs and FSCs in recent years. For example, using slightly different carrier definitions, Leick and Wensveen (2014) find that LCC share of U.S. traffic increased from 16 percent in 2000 to 25 percent in 2007, while Huschelrath and Muller (2012) find that LCC share increased from about 10 percent in 1995 to about 32 percent in 2009.

At the same time, the fare premium charged by FSCs above the LCCs has eroded. Huschelrath and Muller (2012) find that the percent of the top 1000 U.S. routes (in terms of traffic) served by both FSCs and LCCs increased from 10 percent in 1995 to 31 percent in 2009, while the percent of the top 100 U.S. routes served by both increased from 26 percent in 1995 to 64 percent in 2009. At the same time, they find a significant reduction in the fare premium charged by FSCs in comparison to LCCs. Borenstein (2011), states that LCCs compete with FSCs on more than 60 percent of all routes, and that LCC market share has increased from 10 percent in 1994 to 24 percent in 2009. Further, he finds that at the same time, the price premium charged by FSCs over LCCs has eroded. In particular, he estimates that the fare premium has decreased from over 90 percent in the early 1990s to over 30 percent in 2009. (Borenstein, 2011).

As a result of this increased competition between FSC and LCC carriers, there has been some reconfiguration of FSC and LCC operations. Borenstein (2011) points to an expansion of FSC networks by mergers and alliances. Since 2000, mergers of FSCs in the U.S. have included those between American Airlines and TWA, America West and U.S. Airways, Delta and Northwest, United and Continental, and U.S. Airways and American Airlines. A number of “Open Skies” agreements aimed at opening up international airline markets have also allowed U.S. carriers to enter into alliances with international carriers, cooperating on fares, marketing, and capacity with antitrust immunity (Leick and Wensveen, 2014). Since the first alliance between Northwest and KLM in the early 1990s, a number of alliances have been formed, creating three large global alliances (Leick and Wensveen, 2014).

In addition to pursuing mergers and alliances, FSCs have adopted some LCC strategies, including less complicated yield management, unbundling services (e.g. baggage fees), improving aircraft utilization, and providing point-to-point service when there is enough demand (Leick and Wensveen, 2014). Moreover, some FSCs have gone so far as to create an LCC division within their own FSC. However, this has not been very successful in the U.S. (Gillen and Gados, 2008). Gillen and Gados (2008) point out that it has been difficult for FSCs to achieve the efficiencies of a low cost airline within their LCC divisions, due to a perception that the LCC division was the same as the parent company and due to union resistance to a large portion of FSC operations being run like a LCC.

At the same time, some LCCs have started to use some of the business practices used by the FSCs (Leick and Wensveen, 2014). These practices have included: some use of hubs or focus cities, selling tickets using the same methods as the FSCs, more frills (e.g. in-flight entertainment and assigned seating), premium class service, frequent flier programs, codesharing agreements, and multiple types of aircraft (Leick and Wensveen, 2014). Moreover, as noted by Mason and Morrison (2008), there is no homogeneous LCC strategy. Some LCCs have pursued various elements of the FSC strategy from the beginning.

Nonetheless, the increasing competition between LCC and FSC carriers, along with some converging of business practices may suggest a convergence in costs between the two. Tsoukalas, Belobaba, and Swelbar (2008) find a significant convergence between FSC and LCC unit costs during the 2001 through 2006 period. They find that the most significant convergence in unit costs is in labor costs. The authors suggest that FSC bankruptcies and the threat of bankruptcies has allowed them to restructure labor contracts with more flexible work rules and lower pay. At the same time, an increase in the seniority of LCC workers and slower growth has caused an increase in LCC labor expenses (Tsoukala, Belobaba, and Swelbar, 2008).

On the other hand, Borenstein (2011) and Huschelrath and Muller (2012) suggest that there has not been such a convergence in costs between the FSCs and LCCs. Borenstein (2011) finds that FSC unit costs have been between 30 percent and 60 percent higher than the LCCs throughout most of deregulation, and that they averaged 40 percent higher between 2001 and 2011 (with no signs of convergence). Huschelrath and Muller (2012) find that LCCs have either maintained or increased their cost advantage over this period. They find that cost per available seat mile was 8 cents for LCCs and 9.2 cents for FSCs in 1995, while it was 9.2 cents for LCCs and 11.4 cents for FSCs in 2009. When excluding fuel costs, they find that LCC cost per available seat mile drops from 7.48 cents in 1995 to 6.6 cents in 2009, while it increases from 8.4 cents to 11.1 cents for the FSCs.

These conflicting findings suggest that recent cost changes for FSC and LCC carriers are not well understood. In this study, we examine cost changes between 1993 and 2010 resulting from productivity changes and from changes in input prices for three subsets of air carriers: FSCs, LCCs, and a combination of regional and charter carriers (classified as 'other carriers'). The next section of the study provides a brief description of the data used and the sample of airlines included.

III. Data and Empirical Approach

Data

To test for differences in productivity trends by carrier type this study uses individual airline Form 41 financial reports and T-100 traffic data reported by large certificated U.S. air carriers to the U.S. Department of Transportation for the years 1993-2010. After excluding information on cargo carriers, the raw data set is an unbalanced panel of 550 observations for 59 carriers.¹ Information taken from these reports are used to calculate total cost and determinants of cost for airline companies. These determinants include the prices of labor, fuel, capital and all other inputs; as well as an airline's average stage length, total ton miles², number of airports served by the airline and the airline's average load factor.³ An important benefit derived using these data sources is the sample population is large enough to allow separate cost and productivity analyses of full service carriers, low cost carriers and other carriers.

Descriptive statistics on airline companies' cost determinants are reported in Table 1. While these descriptive statistics provide a useful overview of cost determinants, additional insight into differences between the different groups of airlines and productivity changes within each group might be obtained by examining individual characteristics within each group in 1993 and in 2010.

Tables 2, 3, and 4 show a variety of statistics for FSCs, LCCs, and 'other carriers' in 1993.⁴ As the tables show, FSCs and 'other carriers' realize average costs per available seat-mile that are 31 and 37 percent higher than LCCs, respectively. When comparing average costs per ton-mile, FSCs and 'other carriers' realize cost disadvantages of 24 percent and 41 percent, respectively. LCCs have average load factors that exceed those of FSC and other carriers by 9 and 6 percent, respectively. LCCs also show higher average stage lengths in comparison to FSCs and 'other carriers', by about 12 percent and 88 percent, respectively.

¹ The unbalanced panel occurs in part because of airline foreclosures, new carrier entry and airline mergers. Twenty-two observations were deleted due to unreasonably low fuel costs per gallon (less than \$0.40). These included Atlantic Southeastern Airlines in 2010, Compass Airlines in 2010, ExpressJet Airlines in 2009 and 2010, Mesaba Airlines from 1999-2005 and 2008, North America Airlines in 2010, Pinnacle Airlines in 2007, Ryan International Airlines from 1999-2007, and USAir Shuttle in 1994.

² Passenger miles are converted to ton-miles by multiplying them by .1 (Bureau of Transportation Statistics) and added to freight ton-miles. Although it would be desirable to estimate a cost function that includes both types of outputs, the simple correlation between the two is .916. This suggests severe collinearity problems would occur from the inclusion of both outputs in a cost function.

³ Definitions and specification of the method used to compute cost determinants are presented in Table A1 of the appendix.

⁴ In these tables, averages for cost per avail-seat mile are weighted by available seat miles; averages for cost per ton-mile, average load factor, average stage length, airports, labor share, and fuel share are all weighted by ton-miles; average density is weighted by the number of airports; and average available seat miles per employee is weighted by the number of employees. Weighted averages are preferred to simple averages, as there have been significant changes in the numbers of carriers in each group over time. The weighted averages provide a more accurate depiction of carrier characteristics by taking into account large companies' disproportionate share of industry activity. LCCs are identified based on a list from the International Civil Aviation Organization of the United Nations: <http://www.icao.int/sustainability/Documents/LCC-List.pdf>.

In comparing traffic densities (ton-miles per airport) between the various carriers, it is apparent the FSCs operate at much higher traffic densities in comparison to the other two – as expected, given the nature of hub-and-spoke operations. FSC traffic densities are more than 700 percent and 500 percent higher than LCCs and ‘other carriers’, respectively. This suggests that FSCs are likely to realize a cost advantage from economies of density. The number of airports served are also much higher for the FSCs, as expected.

On the other hand, available seat miles per employee are much higher from the LCCs in comparison to the FSCs and ‘other carriers’. This reflects various advantages in the LCC business model – e.g. the point-to-point network used by LCCs requires less ground crew and maintenance due to more spread out flights; serving smaller airports facilitates faster turnaround of planes; LCCs use tighter seat configurations; etc.

Finally, average labor share is higher for FSCs in comparison to LCCs and ‘other carriers’, potentially reflecting less flexible work rules and higher pay. Labor accounts for an average of 33 percent of FSC costs, in comparison to 28 percent and 27 percent for LCCs and ‘other carriers’, respectively.

Tables 5, 6, and 7 show these same statistics for FSCs, LCCs, and ‘other carriers’ in 2010. As the tables show, although the LCCs still enjoy a cost advantage over the ‘other carriers’, the magnitude of cost advantages has changed. In comparing cost per ton-mile between the three carrier types, FSC and “other” carrier costs are 15 percent and 31 percent higher than LCCs, respectively in 2010.

In comparison to 1993, the LCC cost advantage over FSCs and ‘other carriers’ is not quite as big. For FSCs, this likely reflects big increases in average load factor, average stage length, traffic density, and available seat miles per employee. Moreover, the tables also provide some evidence that renegotiating labor contracts may also have had an influence, as labor accounted for an average of 33 percent of FSC costs in 1993 and only 24 percent in 2010.

‘Other carriers’ also realized big increases in load factors, stage lengths, and seat miles per employee from 1993 to 2010. This also is consistent with the reductions in costs that have occurred.

A useful visualization of changes in airline costs for the three carrier types is presented in Figure-1. This figure contains annual changes in average cost per ton-mile weighted by total ton miles for the three categories of air carriers. For the initial observation year in 1993, the average cost for FSCs and ‘other carriers’ are 24 and 41 percent higher than the average cost of LCCs. The LCC average cost advantage over FSCs erodes by 1997; however, the LCC-FSC average cost gap widens following that year and maintains an LCC cost advantage above 15 percent from 2001 to 2010. In contrast to the LCC-FSC average cost gap pattern of a declining then increasing gap, the average cost advantage of LCCs over other carriers remains large throughout the sample observation period. For instance, the LCC cost advantage ranges from a low of 22 percent in 2004 to a high of 52 percent in 1999. In sum, cost findings for FSCs compared to LCCs supports both sets of findings from past research by revealing a period of cost convergence and cost divergence for this post deregulation sample. Cost findings for the ‘other carrier’ group,

which consists of regional and charter carriers comport well with the notion of relatively high costs for a group of companies whose operating characteristics are unlikely to promote cost savings associated with economies of density. While these findings provide interesting insight on relative costs for the three airline categories, a more complete analysis requires cost estimation that allows distinguishing the separate cost and productivity effects of the cost determinants presented in Table-1.

Empirical Approach

The generalized cost function used to decompose productivity changes includes four factor prices, output, three technological characteristics and a time trend, and is specified as follows:

$$C = C(P_L, P_f, P_k, P_o, Q, LOAD, Stg Length, Pts Served, T)$$

where C denotes total cost. The four factor input prices are, P_L the price of labor, P_f the price of fuel price, P_k the price of capital and P_o the unit price of all other inputs. Output is defined as total ton-miles of passengers and freight carried.⁵ Technological variables included in the cost function are the annual average load factor, stage length and number of airports served by an air carrier. Load factor is defined as revenue passenger miles divided by available passenger miles. This variable is included to take into account the fact that many costs of operating a flight (e.g., flight crew, maintenance, fuel) do not increase proportionally with the number of passengers and tons on a flight. Average stage length, or the average segment length, refers to the length of the average flight of a particular airline. This variable is included to account for the fact that many costs are a function of the number of takeoffs or landings (e.g., maintenance, fueling, boarding, security, landing fees) and do not vary proportionally with distance. The number of points served is included as a proxy for firm size. Finally, we include firm fixed effects (i.e. firm dummy variables, including merger variables) variables to account for unmeasured firm characteristics, and a time trend to account for technical change.

The above cost function is then specified using second order Taylor series approximation around the mean. The expansion is simplified by taking the natural logarithms on both sides of the equations and replacing partial derivative with parameters to give the translog specification shown in the following equation:

$$\ln C = \alpha_0 + \sum_i \alpha_i \ln \left(\frac{P_i}{P_i} \right) + \beta \ln \left(\frac{Q}{Q} \right) + \sum_m \sigma_m \ln \left(\frac{a_m}{a_m} \right) + \theta T$$

⁵ As mentioned previously, passenger miles are converted to ton-miles by multiplying them by .1 (Bureau of Transportation Statistics). The correlation between passenger miles and freight ton-miles is .916 in the sample, suggesting severe collinearity problems with using separate outputs.

$$\begin{aligned}
& + \frac{1}{2} \sum_i \sum_j \alpha_{ij} \ln \left(\frac{P_i}{\bar{P}_i} \right) \ln \left(\frac{P_j}{\bar{P}_j} \right) + \sum_i \tau_i \ln \left(\frac{P_i}{\bar{P}_i} \right) \ln \left(\frac{Q}{\bar{Q}} \right) + \sum_i \sum_m \vartheta_{im} \ln \left(\frac{P_i}{\bar{P}_i} \right) \ln \left(\frac{a_m}{\bar{a}_m} \right) \\
& + \sum_i \partial_i \ln \left(\frac{P_i}{\bar{P}_i} \right) T + \phi \frac{1}{2} \ln \left(\frac{Q}{\bar{Q}} \right)^2 + \sum_m \varphi_m \ln \left(\frac{Q}{\bar{Q}} \right) \ln \left(\frac{a_m}{\bar{a}_m} \right) \\
& + \pi \ln \left(\frac{Q}{\bar{Q}} \right) T + \frac{1}{2} \sum_m \sum_n \sigma_{mn} \ln \left(\frac{a_m}{\bar{a}_m} \right) \ln \left(\frac{a_n}{\bar{a}_n} \right) + \sum_m \mu_m \ln \left(\frac{a_m}{\bar{a}_m} \right) t + \frac{1}{2} \gamma T^2 + \epsilon
\end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

Where the symbols P , Q , and a are vectors containing the variables depicting input prices, output and technical characteristics, respectively. Using the translog specification also allows for obtaining input share equations shown below by taking the derivative of the cost equation with respect to input prices and applying Shephard's Lemma.

$$\frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln P_i} = \frac{x_i P_i}{C} = \alpha_i + \sum_j \alpha_{ij} \left(\frac{P_j}{\bar{P}_j} \right) + \tau_i \ln \left(\frac{Q}{\bar{Q}} \right) + \sum_m \vartheta_{im} \ln \left(\frac{a_m}{\bar{a}_m} \right) + \partial_i t + \epsilon \tag{2}$$

where $\alpha_{i=1}$, $\alpha_{i=2}$, $\alpha_{i=3}$, and $\alpha_{i=4}$ represent labor, fuel, capital and other inputs' share of total cost at the mean, respectively, and x_i represents the amount of input i used. This system of equations (the cost function and input share functions) is estimated within a seemingly unrelated system with one of the input share equations excluded to avoid perfect collinearity. Last, the necessary and sufficient homogeneity and symmetry conditions to construct a cost function that is linearly homogenous in factor input prices are imposed as follows using the following constraints:

$$\sum_i \alpha_i = 1, \sum_i \alpha_{ij} = \sum_j \alpha_{ij} = 0, \sum_i \tau_i = \sum_i \vartheta_{im} = \sum_i \partial_i = 0, \alpha_{ij} = \alpha_{ji}.$$

A convenient feature of the translog specification is that because all variables except time are normalized by their mean values, the first order terms can be interpreted as elasticities at the means of all variables except time. The results derived from estimating the translog cost are used within the decomposition framework that closely resembles the approach proposed by Gollop and Roberts (1981) for the electric utility industry and Bitzan and Peoples (2014) for the transportation sector. Their approach decomposes productivity changes while holding input prices constant. Hence, their productivity results can be viewed as measures of total factor

productivity (TFP).⁶ For this study's analysis the influence of input prices on costs are also considered. Including analysis of price effects is critical to airline cost analysis given the potential differences in fuel consumption and use of labor among FSCs and LCCs.

Gollop and Roberts reveal that the decline in average cost over time, when holding prices constant, can be separated into a portion that is attributable to movements along the firm's long-run average cost curve (economies of scale) and a portion that is attributable to shifts in the firm's long-run average cost curve (technical change). That relationship is depicted below by equation (3).

$$\text{Decreasing AC} = -\frac{d\ln AC}{dT} = \left(1 - \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln Q}\right) \frac{\partial \ln Q}{\partial T} - \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial T} \quad (3)$$

where the first component on the right-hand-side of equation (3) denotes decreasing average cost arising from economies of scale and the second component denotes decreasing average cost due to technical change.

While using Gollop and Robert's approach for identifying the components of productivity change is appropriate for many industries, it does not sufficiently identify productivity changes in the airline industry since output can change due to aircrafts carrying more passengers and freight over a given network size or due to airline companies expanding their overall network. Indeed, Keeler (1974) observes that there are two types of potential scale economies in transport industries: (1) returns to density, and (2) returns to firm size. He identifies returns to density as those returns to scale that result from transporting more traffic over a given network size, while he identifies returns to size as returns to scale that results from carrying more traffic as a result of an expanded network. Bitzan and Peoples (2014) show how to adjust the productivity decomposition of Gollop and Roberts to the transportation industries, by separating the effects of density from the effects of firm size. We start by showing the rate of change of total costs (holding input prices constant) as being the sum of the rates of change in total costs resulting from changes in output, network size, firm characteristics, and unexplained technical change:

$$\frac{d\ln C}{dT} = \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln Q} \frac{\partial \ln Q}{\partial T} + \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln NS} \frac{\partial \ln NS}{\partial T} + \sum_i \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln CHAR_i} \frac{\partial \ln CHAR_i}{\partial T} + \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial T}$$

Where the symbol NS demotes network size and the symbol *CHAR* is a vector containing the variables measuring load factor, stage length and number of airports served.

⁶ Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is the portion of output growth not explained by increases in the amount of inputs used in production. As such, its level is determined by how efficiently and intensely the inputs are utilized in production (Comin, 2008).

The rate of change of average cost is then obtained by subtracting the rate of change in output over time from the rate of change in total costs as depicted by equation (4)

$$\frac{d \ln AC}{dT} = \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln Q} \frac{\partial \ln Q}{\partial T} - \frac{\partial \ln Q}{\partial T} + \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln NS} \frac{\partial \ln NS}{\partial T} + \sum_i \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln CHAR_i} \frac{\partial \ln CHAR_i}{\partial T} + \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial T} \quad (4)$$

Bitzan and Peoples (2014) show that the negative of this rate of change in average costs gives the productivity growth equation shown below:

$$-\frac{d \ln AC}{dT} = \left(1 - \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln Q} - \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln NS}\right) \frac{\partial \ln NS}{\partial T} + \left(1 - \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln Q}\right) \left(\frac{\partial \ln Q}{\partial T} - \frac{\partial \ln NS}{\partial T}\right) - \sum_i \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln CHAR_i} \frac{\partial \ln CHAR_i}{\partial T} - \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial T} \quad (5)$$

The first component on the right hand side of equation (5) denotes productivity growth resulting from a change in firm size. The second component represents productivity growth resulting from a change in density. The third component denotes productivity growth arising from changes in company characteristics, and the last component denotes productivity growth arising from unexplained technical change. The sum of these components provide total factor productivity, which does not account for cost change attributable to changes in input prices. Following Denny, fuss, Everson and Waverman (1981), we include the product of the input share of total cost and the change in that input's price over time to capture the effect of input prices on cost change. This input price effect is presented as the last component on the equation (6).⁷

$$-\frac{d \ln AC}{dT} = \left(1 - \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln Q} - \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln NS}\right) \frac{\partial \ln NS}{\partial T} + \left(1 - \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln Q}\right) \left(\frac{\partial \ln Q}{\partial T} - \frac{\partial \ln NS}{\partial T}\right) - \sum_i \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln CHAR_i} \frac{\partial \ln CHAR_i}{\partial T} - \sum_j \frac{P_i X_i}{C} \times \frac{d P_i}{dT} - \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial T} \quad (6)$$

For our analysis, cost change resulting from each of these effects is computed using the weighted average of industry characteristics in each year of our data. Specifically, decreases in average cost from the previous year, are separated into the four cost components by using cost function parameter estimates and industry averages of independent variables. Specifically, a two year average of independent variables is used to measure changes due to unexplained technical change, returns to density, returns to firm size, and returns to firm characteristics for any given year.⁸ In addition, as depicted in the following equations, the productivity decomposition

⁷ The symbol X_i presented in the last component of the right-hand-side of equation (6) denotes factor input i .

⁸ Gollop and Roberts (1981) also used a two year average of independent variables in measuring productivity effects due to scale and technical changes in the U.S. Electric Power Industry.

process uses the mean normalized values of cost determinants since these values are used when estimating the translog cost function.

$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{Decreasing AC from unexplained Tech. Change in year } t = -\frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial T} \Big|_{YR_t} = \\
& - \left[\theta + \sum_i \partial_i \left(\frac{\ln\left(\frac{P_i}{P_i}\right)_t + \ln\left(\frac{P_i}{P_i}\right)_{t-1}}{2} \right) + \pi \left(\frac{\ln\left(\frac{Q}{Q}\right)_t + \ln\left(\frac{Q}{Q}\right)_{t-1}}{2} \right) + \sum_m \mu_m \left(\frac{\ln\left(\frac{a_m}{a_m}\right)_t + \ln\left(\frac{a_m}{a_m}\right)_{t-1}}{2} \right) + \right. \\
& \left. \gamma \left(\frac{T+(T-1)}{2} \right) \right] \quad (7)
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{Decreasing AC from Density Economies in year } t \\
& = \left(1 - \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln Q} \Big|_{YR_t} \right) \left(\frac{\partial \ln Q}{\partial T} \Big|_{YR_t} - \frac{\partial \ln NS}{\partial T} \Big|_{YR_t} \right) = \\
& \left[1 - \left\{ \beta + \sum_i \tau_i \left(\frac{\ln\left(\frac{P_i}{P_i}\right)_t + \ln\left(\frac{P_i}{P_i}\right)_{t-1}}{2} \right) + \phi \left(\frac{\ln\left(\frac{Q}{Q}\right)_t + \ln\left(\frac{Q}{Q}\right)_{t-1}}{2} \right) + \sum_m \varphi_m \left(\frac{\ln\left(\frac{a_m}{a_m}\right)_t + \ln\left(\frac{a_m}{a_m}\right)_{t-1}}{2} \right) + \right. \right. \\
& \left. \left. \pi \left(\frac{T+(T-1)}{2} \right) \right\} \left[\left(\ln\left(\frac{Q}{Q}\right)_t - \ln\left(\frac{Q}{Q}\right)_{t-1} \right) - (\ln NS_t - \ln NS_{t-1}) \right] \right] \quad (8)
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{Decreasing AC from Size Economies in year } t = \left(1 - \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln Q} \Big|_{YR_t} - \right. \\
& \left. \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln NS} \Big|_{YR_t} \right) \left(\frac{\partial \ln NS}{\partial T} \Big|_{YR_t} \right) = \\
& \left[1 - \left\{ \beta + \sum_i \tau_i \left(\frac{\ln\left(\frac{P_i}{P_i}\right)_t + \ln\left(\frac{P_i}{P_i}\right)_{t-1}}{2} \right) + \phi \left(\frac{\ln\left(\frac{Q}{Q}\right)_t + \ln\left(\frac{Q}{Q}\right)_{t-1}}{2} \right) + \sum_m \varphi_m \left(\frac{\ln\left(\frac{a_m}{a_m}\right)_t + \ln\left(\frac{a_m}{a_m}\right)_{t-1}}{2} \right) + \right. \right. \\
& \left. \left. \pi \left(\frac{T+(T-1)}{2} \right) \right\} - \left\{ \sigma_{mNS} + \sum_i \vartheta_{imNS} \left(\frac{\ln\left(\frac{P_i}{P_i}\right)_t + \ln\left(\frac{P_i}{P_i}\right)_{t-1}}{2} \right) + \varphi_{mNS} \left(\frac{\ln\left(\frac{Q}{Q}\right)_t + \ln\left(\frac{Q}{Q}\right)_{t-1}}{2} \right) + \right. \right. \\
& \left. \left. \sum_n \sigma_{mnNS} \left(\frac{\ln\left(\frac{a_m}{a_m}\right)_t + \ln\left(\frac{a_m}{a_m}\right)_{t-1}}{2} \right) + \mu_{mNS} \left(\frac{T+(T-1)}{2} \right) \right\} \right] (\ln NS_t - \ln NS_{t-1}) \quad (9)
\end{aligned}$$

where, $NS \in a_m$.

$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{Decreasing AC from change in Char } m \text{ in year } t = \left(-\frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln a_m} \Big|_{YR_t} \right) \left(\frac{\partial \ln a_m}{\partial T} \Big|_{YR_t} \right) = \\
& \left[- \left\{ \sigma_m + \sum_i \vartheta_{im} \left(\frac{\ln \left(\frac{P_i}{P_i} \right)_t + \ln \left(\frac{P_i}{P_i} \right)_{t-1}}{2} \right) + \varphi_m \left(\frac{\ln \left(\frac{Q}{Q} \right)_t + \ln \left(\frac{Q}{Q} \right)_{t-1}}{2} \right) \right. \right. \\
& \quad \left. \left. + \sum_l \phi_{ml} \left(\frac{\ln \left(\frac{a_l}{a_l} \right)_t + \ln \left(\frac{a_l}{a_l} \right)_{t-1}}{2} \right) + \mu_m \left(\frac{T + (T-1)}{2} \right) \right\} \left[\ln \left(\frac{a_m}{a_m} \right)_t \right. \right. \\
& \quad \left. \left. - \ln \left(\frac{a_m}{a_m} \right)_{t-1} \right] \right]
\end{aligned}$$

Decreasing AC from changes in factor input prices in year t=

$$\begin{aligned}
-\sum_i \frac{P_i X_i}{C} \times \frac{\partial \ln P_i}{\partial t} = & \left\{ \left(\frac{\left(\frac{P_1 X_1}{C} \right)_t + \left(\frac{P_1 X_1}{C} \right)_{t-1}}{2} \right) \left(\ln \left(\frac{P_1}{P_1} \right)_t - \ln \left(\frac{P_1}{P_1} \right)_{t-1} \right) + \right. \\
& \left(\frac{\left(\frac{P_2 X_2}{C} \right)_t + \left(\frac{P_2 X_2}{C} \right)_{t-1}}{2} \right) \left(\ln \left(\frac{P_2}{P_2} \right)_t - \ln \left(\frac{P_2}{P_2} \right)_{t-1} \right) + \left(\frac{\left(\frac{P_3 X_3}{C} \right)_t + \left(\frac{P_3 X_3}{C} \right)_{t-1}}{2} \right) \left(\ln \left(\frac{P_3}{P_3} \right)_t - \ln \left(\frac{P_3}{P_3} \right)_{t-1} \right) + \\
& \left. \left(\frac{\left(\frac{P_4 X_4}{C} \right)_t + \left(\frac{P_4 X_4}{C} \right)_{t-1}}{2} \right) \left(\ln \left(\frac{P_4}{P_4} \right)_t - \ln \left(\frac{P_4}{P_4} \right)_{t-1} \right) \right\} \quad (10)
\end{aligned}$$

In equation (10) the variables P_1 , P_2 , P_3 and P_4 represent input prices for labor, fuel, capital and other inputs. The specification of this equation indicates that the direction of the price effect on cost is due exclusively to the direction of the change in input prices, while the size of input cost shares exclusively influence the magnitude of this change. The opportunity for further analysis of input price effects on airline operations is obtained from examining the translog parameter estimates of the input price-time interactions and input price-output interactions. These parameter estimates provide useful information identifying whether technology is factor using or factor saving for the different factors of production. For instance, a positive time-factor price interaction suggests that technology is factor using for that factor and that an increase in the factor price hinders technical change – if opportunities for technical change are associated with that factor of production, adopting those technologies are now more expensive. In contrast, a negative time-factor price interaction suggests that technology is factor saving for that technology and that an increase in the factor price accelerates technical change – if opportunities

for technical change are associated with other factors of production, the price increase encourages a switch to those technologies. A positive output-factor price interaction suggest the scale of an airline's operation increases the factor share of the input. Hence, compared to small carriers large carriers are susceptible to more expensive operations if size is associated with higher input share.

IV. Empirical Results

A. Cost Findings

Estimation results for the three carrier types are presented in Table 8.⁹ As the table shows, while all three cost function estimations show a good overall fit, there are important differences among the cost functions for each type of carrier.

As mentioned previously, because all variables except time are normalized by their mean values, first-order terms can be interpreted as elasticities when all variables except time are at their mean levels.¹⁰ In examining factor shares at the mean values of all variables, some obvious differences are apparent among the various carrier types. Labor accounts for about 30 percent of the average FSC carriers' costs, while it only accounts for 24.3 percent and 23.6 percent of the average LCC and 'other carriers' costs, respectively. This likely reflects higher wages and less flexibility embedded in FSC labor contracts, in comparison to labor contracts for the other two carrier types. Furthermore, important differences are also apparent in fuel and other factors of production shares. Fuel accounts for 23 percent of the average LCC carrier's costs, while it only accounts for 17 percent and 19 percent of the average FSC and 'other carriers' costs, respectively.¹¹ Other factors of production account for about 38 percent of "other" carrier costs, while they only account for 35 percent and 33 percent of FSC and LCC costs, respectively.

The parameter estimates on revenue-ton miles also show important differences in returns to density for the different types of carriers. As Table 8 shows, the elasticity of costs with respect to ton-miles is .99 for LCCs, .88 for FSCs, and .68 for 'other carriers', at the point of means for all variables except time. This suggests that the average LCC is operating at constant returns to density, while FSCs and 'other carriers' are operating at increasing returns to density. However, when examining the elasticity of costs with respect to output at the means of all variables (including time), it is apparent that FSCs and LCCs are characterized by constant returns to density, while 'other carriers' are characterized by increasing returns to density.

⁹ Regional carriers and charter carriers are combined into one "other" category for analysis.

¹⁰ Elasticities when all variables are placed at their mean levels can be obtained by multiplying the interaction term between time and the variable of interest by the mean value of time and adding it to the first order term. For example the elasticity of cost with respect to labor price at the mean of all variables for the FSC sample is $.317962 - .00206 \times 8.49 = .30$, where 8.49 is the mean of time in the FSC sample. Means of time are 8.49, 9.44, and 8.96 in the FSC, LCC, and other samples, respectively.

¹¹ For LCCs at the average of all variables, Fuel Share = $.242112 - .00175 \times 9.44$.

The low cost elasticity at the point of means for ‘other carriers’ (0.76) in comparison to FSCs (1.00) and LCCs (1.01) likely reflects the very low traffic densities of these ‘other carriers’, and the resulting opportunities for cost savings with more traffic. When comparing LCC and FSC cost elasticities at the point of means of all variables, at first the similarity seems quite puzzling. FSCs have much higher traffic densities, and it seems should have exhausted much more of available density economies.

However, the similarity in elasticities, despite the large differences in traffic densities between FSCs and LCCs may reflect a difference between hub-and-spoke operations and point-to-point operations. As mentioned previously, LCCs, by operating on a point-to-point network are often able to use less ground crew and maintenance workers, and fewer gates as a result of not having to accommodate a large number of arrivals in a short-time window. Consequently, at a given level of density, the lower ground crew, maintenance, and gate expenses suggest less opportunities for cost savings from handling more traffic. Similarly, lower airport charges from serving secondary airports also suggest less opportunities to spread out airport charges with more traffic.

The parameter estimate for the number of airports has the expected positive sign for both FSCs and ‘other carriers’, although it is not statistically significant for FSCs. This suggests that a given amount of traffic is more expensive to carry over more airports. On the other hand, the sign on the number of airports for the LCCs is negative and statistically significant. While it is difficult to explain this counterintuitive sign, a focus on secondary airports (as encompassed in the LCC business model) does suggest a smaller positive impact from serving more airports (i.e. smaller charges per airport). The negative sign on the number of airports may reflect some other unmeasured characteristic of the business model used by those LCCs that serve a large number of airports.¹² Moreover, when examining the time-airport interaction terms and examining the elasticity of costs with respect to the number of airports at the point of means of all variables (including time), it is .006 for FSCs, -.043 for LCCs, and .297 for ‘other carriers’. Combined with the elasticity of costs with respect to output, these suggest roughly constant to slightly decreasing returns to size for all three types of carriers – i.e. a one percent increase in output as a result of a one percent increase in network size leads to a 1.01 percent increase in costs for FSCs, 0.97 percent increase in costs for LCCs, and a 1.06 percent increase in costs for ‘other carriers’, at the means of all variables (including time).¹³

As expected, the elasticity of costs with respect to average stage length and load factor are negative for all carrier types at the means of all variables.¹⁴ The negative sign on the parameter estimate for stage length reflects economies of flight distance, as many airline costs vary less than proportionally with distance – e.g. fueling, boarding, luggage loading, security fees, and

¹² Recall that business models used by LCCs vary. The LCC business model description is only meant to describe the strategies that are common to many LCCs. Different LCCs employ these strategies to varying degrees. Moreover, the strategies described are not comprehensive of the strategies employed by all LCCs.

¹³ Returns to size are assessed by adding the elasticity of costs with respect to output to the elasticity of costs with respect to network size.

¹⁴ While load factor is positive and not statistically significant for FSCs and ‘other carriers’, time-load factor interaction terms show large and statistically significant negative effects for FSCs and ‘other carriers’.

maintenance costs. The negative sign on the parameter estimate for load factor reflects the fact that many costs vary less than proportionally with the number of passengers – e.g. maintenance costs, fuel costs, flight crew, etc.

Interestingly, the first order term on the time trend shows that unexplained technical change is positive for FSC and ‘other carriers’ at the point of means, while it is negative for LCCs at the point of means. However, the time trend is only significant in the LCC equation.

As highlighted in the methodology section, important insights into technical change can be obtained by examining time-input price interactions. As Table 8 shows, technology is labor and fuel saving, while it is capital and other materials using for FSCs and LCCs. This suggests that increase labor and fuel prices have accelerated technical change. This is supported by evidence that airlines have negotiated labor contracts that have increased labor flexibility and invested in more fuel efficient aircraft. On the other hand, for ‘other carriers’, the time-input price interactions suggest that technology is labor and fuel using, and capital and other materials saving. This may suggest that regional carriers have not had the same success in negotiating more flexible work rules and have not invested in more fuel efficient aircraft to the same extent as LCCs and FSCs.

The methodology section also reveals the important insights obtained by examining the output (RTM)- input price interactions. The parameter estimates on these interaction terms presented in Table-8 indicate that scale is associated with increasing labor cost share for FSCs and LCCs. This suggests increasing output is associated with more labor intensive operations. Such findings provide further rationale for negotiating for greater labor flexibility. The parameter estimate on the fuel price-output interaction term is only statistically significant for FSCs and is positive, which also supports FSCs emphasis on investing in fuel efficient aircrafts as they grow their operations.

The next section of this chapter breaks down the sources of cost savings over time for the three types of carriers. In addition to examining productivity effects, we also examine the impacts of factor price changes on costs.

B. Productivity Findings

Tables 9, 10, and 11 show the estimated yearly changes in average costs resulting from productivity gains and from changes in input prices for the three types of carriers. Our measure of productivity change accounts for cost savings from changing the scale of operations, and from shifts in the average cost function over time (technical change). Moreover, in evaluating technical change, we account for technical change that is embedded in changes in movement characteristics (e.g. changes in average stage length and load factor). We also distinguish between two types of scale economies encountered in the transportation industries – economies of density and economies of size.

For each type of carrier, the tables show the annual changes in firm density, size, and movement characteristics, as well as the productivity gains resulting from such changes. Specifically, each table shows: (1) annual productivity gains resulting from changes in firm output, leaving

network size constant (gains from changes in traffic density), (2) annual productivity gains resulting from changes in output that are a result of a change in the number of airports served (gains from changes in firm size), (3) annual productivity gains resulting from changes in movement characteristics (load factor and stage length), (4) annual productivity gains resulting from unexplained technical change (time trend), and (5) annual changes in costs resulting from changes in input prices. We compute average cost savings using annual weighted averages of industry characteristics, using the methodology highlighted in Section III.¹⁵

Table 9 shows the annual cost savings realized by full service carriers between 1993 and 2010. As the table shows, FSCs experienced a large increase in traffic density (62 percent increase) and a decrease in firm size (16 percent decrease) over this time period. However, because FSCs realize roughly constant returns to density and to firm size, these changes in density and firm size had negligible impacts on average costs.

The table also shows large increases in average load factor and average stage length for the FSCs. Average load factor increased by 27 percent over this period, while average stage length increased by almost 43 percent. These changes led to large cost savings of more than 58 percent. While these types of cost savings are often not counted as part of technical change, we argue (as in Bitzan and Peoples, 2014) that much of these cost savings are embedded in technical change. Large portions of the increases in load factors and stage lengths are due to innovations in business models aimed at enhancing efficiency.

Unexplained technical change captured by the time trend shows an increase in average costs of about 15 percent over this time period. When combining the effects on average cost from changes in density, firm size, movement characteristics, and unexplained technical change, the total factor productivity gains are in excess of 45 percent for the FSCs over this time period.

Finally, increased input prices resulted in average costs increasing nearly 29 percent over this period for the FSCs. Between 1993 and 2010, FSCs experienced a 13 percent increase in the price of labor, nearly a 100 percent increase in the price of fuel, a 26 percent increase in the price of other materials, and a 15 percent decrease in the price of capital (changes in input prices not shown). These increased input prices offset the productivity gains somewhat, resulting in an overall estimated 17 percent reduction in average costs over the period.

Table 10 shows the annual cost savings realized by low-cost carriers between 1993 and 2010. As the table shows, like FSCs, the LCCs had a large increase in traffic density and a small decrease in firm size over this time period. But, like the FSCs, because of the roughly constant returns to density and firm size, these changes in density and firm size have very small impacts on average costs.

Table 10 also shows about a 16 percent increase in the average load factor and an 18 percent decrease in average stage length for the LCCs over this period. Despite the cost saving impact of

¹⁵ Averages for all variables except ton-miles are weighted by ton-miles. Ton-mile averages are simple averages. Because we are using industry weighted averages, our measured productivity gains capture changes in the composition of firms in the industry as well as productivity changes.

an increase in load factor, the overall effect of these changes on LCC average costs is small due to the cost hindering impact of shorter stage lengths. In total, changes in movement characteristics resulted in about a 1.9 percent increase in average costs.

The impact of unexplained technical change was very similar to that for FSCs over this period, at nearly a 14 percent increase in costs. In total, changes in density, firm size, movement characteristics, and unexplained technical change resulted in total factor productivity losses of nearly 16 percent for the LCCs over this period.

Table 10 shows that the impact of input price changes more than offset the decline in productivity for the LCCs, resulting in an overall cost decrease of nearly 11 percent over this period. Despite a 94 percent increase in the price of fuel and a 22 percent increase in the price of labor, the LCCs realized huge decreases in the price of capital (74 percent) and in the price of other materials (difference in logs of -1.14), resulting in an overall decrease in average costs from the changes in input prices of 27 percent.

Annual changes in average costs for ‘other carriers’ are shown in Table 11. As the table shows, ‘other carriers’ had a 19 percent increase in density and a 43 percent increase in size over the 1993-2010 period. Although ‘other carriers’ show increasing returns to density at the point of means and slightly decreasing returns to firm size at the point of means, these changes had a small impact on average costs.

‘Other carriers’ also had increases in average load factor and average stage length of 16 percent and 26 percent, respectively over the period. These resulted in cost savings of about 8 percent since 1993.

Unlike the FSCs and LCCs, unexplained technical change was positive for the ‘other carriers’. This change resulted in a 30 percent cost saving over this time period. This may be due to the recent innovations that have occurred in regional aircraft. Leick and Wensveen (2014) note that Embraer and Bombardier have introduced newer more efficient narrow-body aircraft that have allowed regional carriers to bypass congested hub airports. In total, after accounting for cost increases resulting from increases in labor price, fuel price, and other materials price, we estimate about a 8.4 percent decrease in “other” carrier costs over this period.

V. Concluding Remarks

Increasing competitiveness following regulatory reform in the airline industry places a premium on carriers’ abilities to save costs. Indeed, the post reform era in the US airline industry has been heavily influenced by the performance of low cost carriers. Their prominence in the industry creates a challenge to full service (legacy) carriers who have been forced to take steps to become more cost competitive. At issue is whether the US airline industry has experienced cost convergence among LCCs and full service carriers. This study addresses this question by exploring the sources of productivity gains for LCCs, full service carriers and other carriers such as regional and charter carriers. Identifying the source of productivity gains contributes to our

understanding business models that are more appropriate for facilitating cost savings across carrier groups.

Findings for weighted average cost reveals cost declines for all three carrier groups. For instance, average cost declines 17 percent for FSCs, 11 percent for LCCs, and 8 percent for 'other' carriers for the 1993-2010 sample. Such findings suggest cost convergence between LCCs and FSCs in this industry. LCCs, though retain their cost advantage throughout the sample observation even though the advantage has eroded. Findings on productivity decomposition reveal sources contributing to cost savings differ for FSC, LCC, and 'other' carriers. FSCs have benefitted from nontrivial productivity gains due to changes in load factor and stage length. Changes in input prices explain the cost declines for LCCs; and productivity gains due to changes in load factor, stage length and unexplained technical change contribute to cost declines for 'other' carriers. For FSCs, these findings are interpreted as suggesting that any efficiency improvements that occurred from mergers and acquisitions were likely from increases in load factors and stage lengths, rather than from increases in system density or firm size. Moreover, cost findings for FSCs provide evidence revealing the importance of the hub and spoke network system due to its ability to promote high load factors. In addition, FSC cost findings indicate the benefits of relying on feeder carriers for short hauls and focusing on long haul routes to take advantage of cost savings associated with longer stage lengths. Findings on input price effects for LCCs (from reductions in capital and other materials prices) are consistent with this carrier group's history of negotiating low prices from suppliers. Findings on unexplained technical change for 'other' carriers suggest gains from increasing specialization, as these findings comport well with the notion that investments in increasingly specialized equipment by efficient regional carriers have allowed this group of carriers to achieve cost savings that are unique.

In sum, during the recent period of stepped-up competition in the US airline industry carriers in all three major classifications have experienced cost savings. The sources of these savings are tied to the unique characteristics of each classification group. The widespread cost savings associated with these productivity gains suggest air transport passengers and freight shippers are the primary beneficiaries of such competition.

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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (all prices are in 2005 \$)		
Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation
Cost per Available Seat-Mile (\$)	0.1415	0.0589
Cost per Ton-Mile (\$)	2.0535	1.2252
Load Factor	0.6938	0.0951
Stage Length	786.3702	505.4139
Ton-Miles	2,509,444,978	4,131,154,593
Airports	124.6945	86.2335
Labor Price (\$)	62,548	18,791
Fuel Price (\$)	1.2821	0.7964
Capital Price (\$)	1.5568	2.0162
Other Price (\$)	2.5426	3.8988
Labor Share	0.2665	0.0671
Capital Share	0.2099	0.0650
Fuel Share	0.1790	0.0853
Other Share	0.3446	0.0898
*550 Observations		

Table 2: 1993 Air Carrier Characteristics (costs in 2005 \$)									
Full Service Carriers									
Carrier	Cost per Available Seat-Mile	Cost per Ton-Mile	Avg. Load Factor (%)	Avg. Stage Length	Density (ton-miles per airport) (millions)	Airports	Available Seat Miles per Employee (millions)	Labor Share	Fuel Share
Alaska Airlines	\$0.140	\$2.09	58.5	651.8	5.6	113	1.6	.30	.11
American Airlines	\$0.125	\$1.73	60.4	975.4	49.5	234	1.8	.33	.11
Continental Airlines	\$0.107	\$1.46	63.3	845.2	20.0	231	1.7	.27	.14
Delta Airlines	\$0.130	\$1.79	62.3	750.2	41.4	232	1.9	.36	.11
Northwest Airlines	\$0.123	\$1.35	66.7	842.7	41.1	196	2.1	.31	.13
Trans World Airways	\$0.122	\$1.62	63.5	808.1	15.7	172	1.4	.35	.14
United Airlines	\$0.126	\$1.56	67.2	1012.3	57.8	210	1.9	.33	.11
US Airways	\$0.155	\$2.42	59.4	536.0	26.3	146	1.3	.39	.09
Weighted Average¹⁶	\$0.127	\$1.67	63.5	867.6	34.7	211	1.8	.33	.12

Table 3: 1993 Air Carrier Characteristics (costs in 2005 \$)									
Low Cost Carriers									
Carrier	Cost per Available Seat-Mile	Cost per Ton-Mile	Avg. Load Factor (%)	Avg. Stage Length	Density (ton-miles per airport) (millions)	Airports	Available Seat Miles per Employee (millions)	Labor Share	Fuel Share
ATA Airlines	\$0.070	\$1.05	67.0	1354.7	1.6	363	3.4	.24	.18
Midwest Airline	\$0.149	\$2.19	59.9	681.2	1.1	87	1.3	.28	.15
Southwest Airlines	\$0.102	\$1.47	67.7	376.5	14.3	121	2.0	.32	.14
Tower Air	\$0.104	\$1.05	78.9	3035.9	3.3	123	4.5	.19	.19
Weighted Average	\$0.097	\$1.35	68.9	974.2	4.1	171	2.3	.28	.15

¹⁶ Weights used in Tables 2-7 are as follows: cost per available seat-mile is weighted by available seat miles; cost per ton-mile, average load factor, average stage length, airports, labor share, and fuel share are weighted by ton-miles; density is weighted by number of airports; available seat miles per employee are weighted by number of employees.

Table 4: 1993 Air Carrier Characteristics (costs in 2005 \$)

Other Carriers									
Carrier	Cost per Available Seat-Mile	Cost per Ton-Mile	Avg. Load Factor (%)	Avg. Stage Length	Density (ton-miles per airport) (millions)	Airports	Available Seat Miles per Employee (millions)	Labor Share	Fuel Share
Air Wisconsin Airlines	\$0.405	\$7.91	50.6	157.2	38.1	1	0.7	0.24	0.06
Aloha Air Cargo	\$0.277	\$3.92	61.1	130.4	10.5	7	0.6	0.37	0.11
America West Airlines	\$0.097	\$1.38	65.3	644.2	13.1	92	1.8	0.24	0.13
Atlantic Southeast Airlines	\$0.248	\$5.27	46.8	235.5	0.6	64	0.4	0.22	0.08
Hawaiian Airlines	\$0.105	\$1.29	74.3	278.8	12.2	26	1.7	0.33	0.15
Horizon Air	\$0.285	\$4.82	56.8	163.8	1.6	37	0.5	0.34	0.08
Markair	\$0.122	\$1.68	61.4	610.7	2.8	47	1.7	0.23	0.15
US Air Shuttle	\$0.284	\$6.13	46.3	198.8	0.9	35	0.9	0.32	0.10
Westair Airlines	\$0.240	\$4.35	55.2	175.7	0.5	41	0.4	0.24	0.12
Weighted Average	\$0.133	\$1.90	65.0	517.1	5.5	69.2	1.3	0.27	0.13

Table 5: 2010 Air Carrier Characteristics (costs in 2005 \$)

Full Service Carriers									
Carrier	Cost per Available Seat-Mile	Cost per Ton-Mile	Avg. Load Factor (%)	Avg. Stage Length	Density (ton-miles per airport) (millions)	Airports	Available Seat Miles per Employee (millions)	Labor Share	Fuel Share
Alaska Airlines	\$0.118	\$1.37	83.3	1084.9	25.9	81	2.7	.28	.23
American Airlines	\$0.136	\$1.44	81.9	1289.9	92.0	157	2.3	.28	.24
Continental Airlines	\$0.133	\$1.40	83.9	1613.3	54.1	167	2.9	.23	.21
Delta Airlines	\$0.139	\$1.46	83.7	1234.2	73.1	261	2.7	.23	.25
United Airlines	\$0.141	\$1.68	84.1	1545.2	47.6	130	2.8	.23	.23
US Airways	\$0.147	\$1.42	82.3	981.2	93.5	132	2.4	.20	.20
Weighted Average	\$0.138	\$1.46	83.3	1331.0	68.0	179.7	2.6	.24	.23

Table 6: 2010 Air Carrier Characteristics (costs in 2005 \$)

Low Cost Carriers									
Carrier	Cost per Available Seat-Mile	Cost per Ton-Mile	Avg. Load Factor (%)	Avg. Stage Length	Density (ton-miles per airport) (millions)	Airports	Available Seat Miles per Employee (millions)	Labor Share	Fuel Share
AirTran Airways	\$0.098	\$1.20	81.3	758.1	13.8	142	3.0	.22	.31
Allegiant Air	\$0.085	\$0.95	89.9	913.9	2.2	253	3.8	.19	.43
Frontier Airlines	\$0.112	\$1.33	83.6	964.8	11.1	83	2.2	.17	.24
JetBlue Airways	\$0.099	\$1.21	81.4	1097.8	24.4	117	3.1	.25	.28
Republic Airlines	\$0.091	\$1.16	77.9	531.4	5.2	117	3.9	.21	.14
Southwest Airlines	\$0.110	\$1.37	79.3	647.8	41.7	190	2.8	.32	.29
Spirit Airlines	\$0.080	\$0.97	82.1	940.8	20.1	33	3.9	.22	.33
Sun Country Airlines	\$0.087	\$1.22	70.8	1200.8	0.6	276	3.5	.21	.30
USA 3000 Airlines	\$0.098	\$1.30	75.5	1195.3	0.6	140	3.6	.20	.28
Virgin America	\$0.086	\$1.06	81.5	1545.9	52.0	12	4.8	.17	.31

Weighted Average	\$0.103	\$1.27	80.5	816.7	12.0	152.3	3.0	.27	.29
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Table 7: 2010 Air Carrier Characteristics (costs in 2005 \$)									
Other Carriers									
Carrier	Cost per Available Seat-Mile	Cost per Ton-Mile	Avg. Load Factor (%)	Avg. Stage Length	Density (ton-miles per airport) (millions)	Airports	Available Seat Miles per Employee (millions)	Labor Share	Fuel Share
Air Wisconsin Airlines	\$0.197	\$2.70	72.7	326.3	2.4	81	1.1	.25	.30
American Eagle Airlines	\$0.171	\$2.32	73.9	469.8	5.4	149	1.2	.25	.31
Colgan Air	\$0.207	\$3.36	61.8	208.8	1.1	62	0.8	.28	.10
Continental Micronesia	\$0.129	\$1.49	72.9	1747.0	42.7	7	3.3	.22	.22
Executive Airlines	\$0.264	\$4.71	55.9	194.0	1.7	32	0.6	.31	.15
Gojet Airlines	\$0.084	\$1.05	80.0	598.7	3.2	51	3.6	.16	.19
Hawaiian Airlines	\$0.110	\$1.18	85.5	614.3	34.0	28	2.9	.25	.25
Horizon Air	\$0.195	\$2.56	75.7	333.1	6.0	41	1.1	.30	.19
Mesa Airlines	\$0.133	\$1.68	79.1	410.9	3.2	126	2.4	.10	.29
Miami Air International	\$0.146	\$3.31	44.0	966.2	0.2	258	2.2	.23	.17
Omni Air Express	\$0.090	\$1.59	56.3	2587.2	2.2	121	4.6	.22	.35
Shuttle America	\$0.084	\$1.14	73.5	615.3	3.4	95	3.4	.21	.16
SkyWest Airlines	\$0.103	\$1.30	79.2	472.4	7.5	177	1.9	.28	.17
Weighted Average	\$0.129	\$1.66	76.5	673.5	4.2	106.5	1.8	0.24	0.23




Table 8: Seemingly Unrelated Estimation of Airline Costs, 1993-2010

Variables	Full Service (FSC)	Low Cost (LCC)	Other
<u>Dependent</u>			
Log of total cost			
<u>Explanatory (logs)</u>			
Intercept	16.33987 (355.07)	13.96424 (138.59)	13.40717 (61.02)
Labor Price	0.317962 (36.89)	0.25612 (23.39)	0.209206 (24.19)
Capital Price	0.170759 (32.04)	0.174473 (23.35)	0.214706 (50.11)
Other Price	0.314898 (45.51)	0.327296 (28.86)	0.41947 (63.27)
Fuel Price	0.19638 (27.04)	0.242112 (20.45)	0.156618 (20.09)
Revenue Ton-Miles	0.875015 (19.39)	0.986058 (15.72)	0.678806 (11.04)
Average Stage Length	-0.37471 (-2.85)	-0.64989 (-5.08)	-0.19921 (-1.90)
Load Factor	0.195346 (0.32)	-1.47444 (-3.07)	0.171517 (0.56)
Airports	0.065372 (0.77)	-0.12152 (-2.17)	0.405919 (8.12)
Time	-0.01407 (-1.22)	0.040417 (3.22)	-0.009 (-1.03)
½ Labor Price ²	0.168098 (16.67)	0.113287 (12.17)	0.050892 (6.29)
½ Capital Price ²	0.143356 (27.49)	0.115367 (21.13)	0.108489 (40.45)
½ Other Price ²	0.18586 (34.92)	0.131493 (18.45)	0.117302 (32.54)
½ Fuel Price ²	0.107683 (22.50)	0.106217 (12.68)	0.057741 (10.22)
½ Ton-Miles ²	0.027783 (0.71)	0.071189 (2.55)	0.233387 (8.45)
½ Stage ²	1.813707 (4.31)	0.462934 (1.99)	0.632792 (6.33)
½ LOAD ²	9.435247 (2.07)	4.914889 (1.56)	4.30837 (3.42)
½ Airports ²	-0.29532 (-2.13)	-0.05386 (-1.54)	0.158913 (9.05)

½ Time ²	0.003632 (2.37)	-0.00419 (-3.51)	-0.00023 (-0.28)
Labor Price x Cap Price	-0.04229 (-7.04)	-0.02444 (-4.89)	0.005458 (1.66)
Labor Price x Other Price	-0.06473 (-10.03)	-0.04255 (-6.65)	0.002904 (0.68)
Labor Price x Fuel Price	-0.06108 (-12.83)	-0.0463 (-6.51)	-0.05925 (-10.77)
Labor Price x Ton-Miles	0.023246 (5.25)	0.014503 (3.96)	-0.01376 (-3.14)
Labor Price x Stage	0.015533 (1.38)	0.01685 (1.66)	-0.04336 (-6.46)
Labor Price x LOAD	-0.13498 (-2.44)	-0.17373 (-3.83)	0.127011 (4.59)
Labor Price x Time	-0.00206 (-2.08)	-0.00135 (-1.27)	0.003013 (3.82)
Labor Price x Airports	-0.02364 (-3.14)	0.011361 (2.73)	-0.00313 (-0.85)
Fuel Price x Other Price	-0.03334 (-8.51)	-0.02897 (-4.97)	-0.00237 (-0.72)
Fuel Price x Capital Price	-0.01327 (-4.01)	-0.03096 (-6.37)	0.003885 (1.47)
Fuel Price x Ton-Miles	0.017185 (4.74)	-0.00045 (-0.13)	0.001948 (0.50)
Fuel Price x Stage	0.017009 (2.01)	0.050052 (5.18)	0.045716 (7.91)
Fuel Price x LOAD	0.23585 (5.47)	0.222658 (5.23)	0.090667 (3.62)
Fuel Price x Airports	-0.02345 (-3.91)	0.015759 (4.01)	-0.00167 (-0.49)
Fuel Price x Time	-0.00289 (-3.57)	-0.00175 (-1.52)	0.003903 (5.32)
Other Price x Capital Price	-0.0878 (-23.47)	-0.05997 (-13.77)	-0.11783 (-53.29)
Other Price x Ton-Miles	-0.02744 (-7.88)	-0.01285 (-3.32)	0.008517 (2.51)
Other Price x Stage	-0.03356 (-3.97)	-0.037 (-3.40)	-0.01421 (-2.58)
Other Price x LOAD	-0.0484 (-1.16)	-0.00837 (-0.17)	-0.13702 (-6.18)
Other Price x Airports	0.036485 (6.28)	-0.01829 (-3.98)	0.002355 (0.78)
Other Price x Time	0.003527 (4.50)	0.000264 (0.23)	-0.00392 (-6.19)
Capital Price x Ton-Miles	-0.013	-0.0012	0.003293

	(-4.89)	(-0.52)	(1.51)
Capital Price x Stage	0.001022	-0.0299	0.011861
	(0.16)	(-4.55)	(3.48)
Capital Price x LOAD	-0.05248	-0.04056	-0.08066
	(-1.64)	(-1.43)	(-5.71)
Capital Price x Airports	0.010603	-0.00883	0.00245
	(2.40)	(-3.42)	(1.29)
Capital Price x Time	0.001417	0.002833	-0.00299
	(2.37)	(3.94)	(-7.41)
Ton-Miles x Stage	-0.34521	0.082221	-0.22895
	(-3.37)	(0.95)	(-5.99)
Ton-Miles x LOAD	-0.48747	-0.60149	-0.50915
	(-1.95)	(-3.58)	(-3.18)
Ton-Miles x Airports	0.114049	-0.04101	-0.13143
	(2.09)	(-2.28)	(-5.93)
Ton-Miles x Time	0.014906	0.002971	0.009383
	(2.84)	(0.91)	(2.00)
Stage x LOAD	0.205879	0.093818	1.001485
	(0.35)	(0.23)	(4.99)
Stage x Airports	0.091284	-0.06849	-0.01546
	(0.69)	(-1.03)	(-0.53)
Stage x Time	-0.04215	-0.00573	-0.00645
	(-2.77)	(-0.58)	(-1.21)
LOAD x Airports	0.18681	-0.10634	0.470449
	(0.39)	(-0.58)	(3.99)
LOAD x Time	-0.20323	0.042229	-0.07796
	(-2.67)	(0.90)	(-2.86)
Airports x Time	-0.00695	0.008306	-0.0122
	(-0.79)	(2.08)	(-3.30)

Table-9

Annual Full Service Carrier Cost Savings Due to Productivity Growth from Changes in Density, Firm Size, Movement Characteristics, and Technical Change, and from Changes in Input Prices

Year	Annual Changes in Firm Density, Size, and Movement Chars.				Annual Cost Savings (positive indicates savings)						
	Density Change	Size Change	Load Factor Change	Stage Length Change	Density	Firm Size	Movement Chars.	Unexplained Technical Change	Total Factor Productivity	Input Prices	Total
1994	0.0485	-0.0081	0.0468	0.0151	0.0016	-0.0002	0.0615	-0.0159	0.0470	0.0233	0.0704
1995	0.0154	-0.0003	0.0158	0.0322	0.0006	0.0000	0.0344	-0.0120	0.0230	0.0070	0.0299
1996	0.0291	0.0218	0.0354	0.0263	0.0013	0.0008	0.0490	-0.0088	0.0424	-0.0058	0.0366
1997	0.0858	-0.0317	0.0186	0.0166	0.0042	-0.0014	0.0258	-0.0058	0.0229	0.0042	0.0271
1998	0.0119	-0.0012	0.0018	0.0305	0.0006	-0.0001	0.0180	-0.0070	0.0116	0.0165	0.0280
1999	0.0152	0.0298	0.0018	0.0139	0.0007	0.0012	0.0096	-0.0096	0.0019	-0.0040	-0.0021
2000	-0.0483	-0.0160	0.0201	0.0120	-0.0018	-0.0007	0.0332	-0.0099	0.0208	-0.0591	-0.0382
2001	-0.1379	0.0387	-0.0368	0.0159	-0.0026	0.0015	-0.0489	-0.0140	-0.0640	-0.0300	-0.0940
2002	-0.0873	0.0530	0.0336	0.0095	-0.0001	0.0022	0.0657	-0.0172	0.0506	0.0167	0.0673
2003	-0.1202	0.0877	0.0238	0.0377	0.0001	0.0052	0.0617	-0.0134	0.0537	-0.0431	0.0106
2004	0.1582	-0.0729	0.0293	0.0400	0.0013	-0.0052	0.0678	-0.0096	0.0544	-0.0703	-0.0159
2005	-0.0105	0.0390	0.0306	0.0335	-0.0002	0.0031	0.0605	-0.0052	0.0582	-0.0601	-0.0019
2006	0.0601	-0.0304	0.0201	0.0397	0.0017	-0.0028	0.0450	-0.0016	0.0423	-0.0263	0.0160
2007	0.0325	-0.0268	0.0126	0.0157	0.0011	-0.0024	0.0241	-0.0008	0.0220	0.0040	0.0260
2008	0.4448	-0.3579	-0.0048	0.0293	0.0220	-0.0195	0.0066	-0.0037	0.0055	-0.1594	-0.1539
2009	-0.1268	0.0445	0.0035	0.0263	-0.0079	0.0011	0.0186	-0.0076	0.0042	0.1628	0.1671
2010	0.2498	0.0690	0.0176	0.0339	0.0145	0.0025	0.0488	-0.0077	0.0580	-0.0629	-0.0049
Total	0.6202	-0.1617	0.2698	0.4279	0.0372	-0.0145	0.5814	-0.1496	0.4545	-0.2864	0.1681

Table-10

Annual Low Cost Carrier Cost Savings Due to Productivity Growth from Changes in Density, Firm Size, Movement Characteristics, and Technical Change, and from Changes in Input Prices

Year	Annual Changes in Firm Density, Size, and Movement Chars.				Annual Cost Savings (positive indicates savings)						
	Density Change	Size Change	Load Factor Change	Stage Length Change	Density	Firm Size	Movement Chars.	Unexplained Technical Change	Total Factor Productivity	Input Prices	Total
1994	0.1420	0.0701	-0.0090	-0.0317	0.0004	0.0112	-0.0398	-0.0417	-0.0698	0.1224	0.0526
1995	-0.0378	0.0071	-0.0177	-0.0483	0.0001	0.0010	-0.0697	-0.0372	-0.1059	0.0298	-0.0762
1996	-0.1952	0.0129	-0.0089	-0.1111	0.0016	0.0015	-0.1041	-0.0329	-0.1338	0.0918	-0.0420
1997	-0.0921	-0.0011	-0.0067	0.0401	0.0017	-0.0001	0.0189	-0.0287	-0.0082	-0.0192	-0.0274
1998	0.0704	-0.0783	0.0077	-0.1435	-0.0015	-0.0066	-0.1039	-0.0249	-0.1369	0.0748	-0.0621
1999	0.0996	-0.0075	0.0460	0.0432	-0.0006	-0.0006	0.1186	-0.0217	0.0957	0.0171	0.1128
2000	0.0424	-0.0032	0.0127	-0.1742	0.0005	-0.0003	-0.1310	-0.0182	-0.1490	0.0758	-0.0732
2001	0.1827	-0.1092	-0.0208	0.0810	0.0013	-0.0061	0.0403	-0.0131	0.0224	-0.0008	0.0216
2002	0.1182	-0.0675	-0.0163	0.0506	-0.0018	-0.0015	0.0185	-0.0068	0.0084	0.0561	0.0645
2003	0.4221	-0.0294	0.0338	0.0646	-0.0073	-0.0002	0.0979	-0.0016	0.0888	0.0357	0.1246
2004	0.0581	0.0714	0.0212	0.0411	-0.0006	0.0009	0.0569	0.0019	0.0591	-0.1009	-0.0418
2005	-0.0595	-0.0387	0.0274	0.0220	0.0000	-0.0007	0.0436	0.0055	0.0484	-0.0380	0.0104
2006	0.0853	-0.0061	0.0185	-0.0106	0.0006	-0.0001	0.0064	0.0094	0.0163	-0.0204	-0.0041
2007	0.0581	0.0511	0.0010	0.0135	0.0005	0.0002	0.0107	0.0133	0.0246	0.0214	0.0461
2008	0.0339	0.0445	0.0039	-0.0412	0.0002	-0.0003	-0.0283	0.0172	-0.0111	-0.0976	-0.1086
2009	-0.1387	0.0417	0.0327	0.0107	-0.0026	0.0000	0.0235	0.0203	0.0413	0.0921	0.1334
2010	0.1663	-0.0735	0.0305	0.0174	0.0055	-0.0009	0.0224	0.0233	0.0502	-0.0736	-0.0233
Total	0.9556	-0.1156	0.1559	-0.1764	-0.0018	-0.0025	-0.0192	-0.1359	-0.1594	0.2666	0.1073

Table-11

Annual “Other” Carrier Cost Savings Due to Productivity Growth from Changes in Density, Firm Size, Movement Characteristics, and Technical Change, and from Changes in Input Prices

Year	Annual Changes in Firm Density, Size, and Movement Chars.				Annual Cost Savings (positive indicates savings)						
	Density Change	Size Change	Load Factor Change	Stage Length Change	Density	Firm Size	Movement Chars.	Unexplained Technical Change	Total Factor Productivity	Input Prices	Total
1994	0.2054	-0.0473	0.0167	0.2844	0.0521	0.0042	0.0719	0.0065	0.1347	-0.1030	0.0317
1995	-0.2366	0.1366	-0.0095	-0.0192	-0.0673	-0.0074	-0.0037	0.0090	-0.0694	-0.0104	-0.0798
1996	-0.1021	0.1918	0.0249	0.0106	-0.0307	-0.0106	0.0017	0.0111	-0.0284	-0.0345	-0.0629
1997	0.2879	-0.2065	-0.0029	0.0161	0.0883	0.0091	0.0026	0.0122	0.1122	-0.0045	0.1077
1998	0.0876	-0.1120	-0.0017	-0.1850	0.0227	0.0062	-0.0412	0.0098	-0.0026	0.2377	0.2351
1999	0.1066	0.0243	0.0064	0.0395	0.0250	-0.0016	0.0128	0.0090	0.0452	-0.0404	0.0048
2000	0.0076	0.0973	0.0220	0.0944	0.0020	-0.0045	0.0244	0.0110	0.0329	-0.0736	-0.0407
2001	-0.0235	0.1358	0.0211	0.1247	-0.0071	-0.0026	0.0152	0.0150	0.0206	-0.0578	-0.0373
2002	0.1983	-0.1391	0.0305	0.0636	0.0651	-0.0012	0.0002	0.0176	0.0816	0.0175	0.0991
2003	-0.2167	0.3063	0.0113	-0.0389	-0.0748	0.0052	-0.0024	0.0189	-0.0532	0.1061	0.0529
2004	0.0187	0.0789	0.0115	0.1007	0.0069	0.0017	-0.0041	0.0219	0.0264	-0.0889	-0.0625
2005	0.0662	0.1011	0.0140	0.0038	0.0251	0.0028	-0.0045	0.0243	0.0477	-0.1559	-0.1081
2006	-0.3750	0.1264	0.0048	-0.1064	-0.1425	0.0018	0.0017	0.0269	-0.1121	-0.0872	-0.1993
2007	-0.1835	0.1288	-0.0019	-0.1116	-0.0679	-0.0013	-0.0035	0.0278	-0.0448	0.0815	0.0367
2008	0.0777	-0.1295	-0.0125	-0.0120	0.0267	0.0029	-0.0007	0.0265	0.0554	-0.2040	-0.1486
2009	0.2746	-0.2595	0.0111	-0.0337	0.0826	0.0062	-0.0006	0.0268	0.1149	-0.0268	0.0882
2010	-0.0036	-0.0031	0.0171	0.0333	-0.0010	0.0001	0.0095	0.0274	0.0360	0.1309	0.1669
Total	0.1895	0.4302	0.1628	0.2643	0.0053	0.0110	0.0794	0.3016	0.3973	-0.3134	0.0839

Appendix

Table A1: Variable Definitions and Data Sources	
VARIABLE	SOURCE
Cost and Input Shares	
<i>Total Cost</i>	(Operating Expense + Opportunity Cost of Capital)
Operating Expense	Form 41, Schedule P-6, Line 00360 – Total for the Year
Opportunity Cost of Capital	Net Property and Equipment x Before Tax Cost of Capital
Net Property and Equipment	Form 41, Schedule B-1, Line 16750 – Annual Average over 4 Qtrs
Before Tax Cost of Capital	Calculated by Authors – Data are from Aswath Damodaran, New York University, Damodaran Online: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ - these include: (1) historical U.S. Treasury Bond rates, before tax cost of debt for U.S. Airlines, effective tax rates for U.S. Airlines, U.S. Market Risk Premiums, historical betas for U.S. Airlines, historical debt and equity shares for U.S. Airlines – from 1993-1998, airline beta, tax rate, cost of debt, and equity/debt shares are unavailable – thus, 1999-2010 averages of these variables are used in calculating the cost of capital for 1993-1998.
<i>Capital Share</i>	(Opp. Cost of Capital+Rentals+Deprec.+Amort.)/Total Cost
Rentals	Form 41, Schedule P-6, Line 00310 – Total For the Year
Depreciation	Form 41, Schedule P-6, Line 00320 – Total For the Year
Amortization	Form 41, Schedule P-6, Line 00330 – Total For the Year
<i>Fuel Share</i>	Fuel/Total Cost
Fuel	Form 41, Schedule P-5.2, Line 51451 – Total For the Year
<i>Labor Share</i>	Salaries and Benefits/Total Cost
Salaries and Benefits	Form 41, Schedule P-6, Line 00140 – Total For the Year
<i>Other Share</i>	1 – Capital Share – Fuel Share – Labor Share
Input Prices	
<i>Capital Price</i>	(Opp. Cost of Capital+Rentals+Deprec.+Amort.)/ Air Hours
Air Hours	T-100 Segment, Air Time Minutes/60 --- Total for the Year
<i>Fuel Price</i>	Fuel/Gallons
Gallons	Form T-2, Aircraft Fuel Gallons – Total for the Year
<i>Labor Price</i>	Salaries and Benefits/Full Time Equivalent Employees
Full Time Equiv. Employees	From 41, Schedule P-1(a), FTEEmployees – Annual Average over 12 months
<i>Other Price</i>	(Total Cost – Opp. Cost of Capital – Rentals – Deprec. – Amort. – Fuel – Salaries and Benefits)/Ramp-to-Ramp Hours
Ramp-to-Ramp Hours	T-100 Segment, Ramp-to-Ramp Minutes/60 --- Total for the Year

Output Variables	
<i>Revenue Passenger Miles</i>	T1 Summary Data – Total for the Year
<i>Revenue Ton-Miles (freight and mail)</i>	T1 Summary Data – Total for the Year
Technological Characteristics	
<i>Average Stage Length</i>	T-100 Segment, Average Distance (weighted by number of departures) --- Average for the Year
<i>Load Factor</i>	Revenue Passenger Miles/Available Seat Miles
<i>Available Seat Miles</i>	T1 Summary Data – Total for the Year
<i>Airports Served</i>	T3 U.S. Air Carrier Airport Activity Statistics – Total Number of Airports
<i>Time</i>	Year – 1993
Costs and Input Prices are placed in 2005 prices using the GDP Implicit Price Deflator	